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Abstract:   This paper examines the current state of the trade policy regime in Vietnam 
against the backdrop of market-oriented policy reforms undertaken over the past one-and-
a-half decades.  The core of the paper is an in-depth analysis of the structure of 
protection, focussing on both incentives for import-competing production the bias in the 
incentive structure against export production compared to import-competing production.   
It is found that, despite notable reform efforts, the structure of protection in Vietnam is 
still out of line with that of the major trading nations in the region, in terms of the level 
and the inter-industry dispersion of nominal and effective protection rates.   There is a 
clear ani-export bias in the incentive structure, even though the degree of the bias has 
considerably declined over the years.  There is no evidence to justify the existing 
protection structure on grounds of infant industry protection or employment generation. 
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Trade Policy Reforms and the Structure of Protection in Vietnam 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Following the announcement of doi moi (renovation) policy in 1986, the trade policy 
regime in Vietnam has undergone significant changes.  With a slow and hesitant start in 
the late 1980s, significant reforms were undertaken in the first half of the 1990s with a 
view to reshaping the former closed command economy into a relatively open, market-
based economy.  The reform process lost momentum during 1996-98 partly due to the 
East Asian crisis of 1997-98, but partly (perhaps even more so) due to domestic policy 
ambivalence and complacency resulted from the success of the initial reforms. There has 
however been a renewed emphasis on completing the unfinished reform agenda over the 
past three years. The key recent reform measures included dismantling of quantitative 
import restrictions (on all products except sugar and petroleum products), significant 
reduction in tariffs leading to some reduction in both the level and dispersion of effective 
rate of protection, initiatives to expose public sector enterprises to greater market 
discipline, relaxing restrictions on foreign direct investment, particularly in export-
oriented projects, and lifting restrictions on private-sectors participation in foreign trade 
and setting up business ventures by private entities (individuals and companies).1  
In recent years the Government of Vietnam (GOVN) has also taken initiatives to 
‘locking in’ domestic (unilateral) liberalisation reforms by committing itself to play an 
active role in regional, bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation initiatives.  In July 
1995 Vietnam’ became a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).  The long-draw trade negotiations 
between the governments of Vietnam and the USA culminated in the signing of a 
bilateral trading agreement (the Vietnam–United State Bilateral Trading Agreement, 
VNUSBTA) in July 2001.  The VNUSBTA, which is considered the most comprehensive 
of all bilateral trading agreements the US has ever signed with a developing country, 
came into effect on 10 December 2002.  
                                                 
1   For useful surveys of the reform process in Vietnam, see Dollar 1992, Riedel 1993, Riedel and Comer 
1997, and Auffret 2003. 
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Vietnam applied for membership in the WTO in 1995.  The GOVN considers the 
accession to WTO a pivotal step in making the Vietnamese economy an integral part of a 
ruled-based global trading system. The emphasis on WTO accession has gained added 
impetus following the China’s accession to WTO in 2001. With strong liberalisations 
undertaken by countries with similar entwinement to that of Vietnam around the world, 
and by Vietnam’s neighbours, both unilaterally and multilaterally, WTO accession is 
important for Vietnam to gain access to world markets on equal terms. A detailed 
Memorandum on Vietnamese Foreign Trade and Economic Policy was prepared for the 
WTO Working Party for examination.  Up to now, the Working Party on Vietnam 
Vietnam’s accession has held seven working sessions.  At the last session in December 
2003, the Working Part decided upon the Elements of the Draft Report on Vietnam’s 
accession.  Vietnam has completed its transparency period and in now in the process of 
substantive market access negotiations with member s of the Working Party.  The 
Working Party started work on key ‘elements’ of a draft working party report on 10 
December 2003, the first formal attempt to define the terms of Vietnam’s membership.   
The purpose of this paper is to examine the trade policy regime in Vietnam in the 
context of the trade liberalisation and other market-oriented reforms over the past one-
and-a half decades.  The study is motivated by the conviction that an appraisal of the 
existing policy regime is needed to inform both unilateral policy reforms in Vietnam and 
Vietnam’s effective participation in regional and global trade policy negotiations.  
The study is based on analysis of secondary data from both national (Vietnamese) 
and international sources, review of previous studies, and interviews with officials of 
Ministry of Finance (MOF). The core of the paper is an in-depth analysis of the structure 
of protection based on fresh estimates of effective rates of protection (ERP) using the 
latest input-output table (for 2000) and nominal tariff schedule as at mid-2003.  Going 
beyond the conventional practice of examining effective protection for import-
substitution production, the paper also focuses on the bias in the incentives structure 
against export production compared to import-substitution production (‘ani-export bias’).  
Estimates of effective protection and anti-export bias are related to industry level output, 
export and employment to examine the implications of the policy regime for industrial 
performance.  
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The paper is arranged in six main sections.  Section 2 surveys policy shifts and the 
key elements of the trade policy regime. Section 3 looks at the structure of import tariffs, 
which is the main instrument of trade policy, in comparison with selected countries in 
Asia.  Section 4 examines the overall resource allocation effects of the trade regime 
through the estimation of effective rates of protection.  Section 5 brings together available 
information on the impact of the structure of protection on the performance of domestic 
manufacturing.  The key findings and policy inferences are summarised in the final 
section.  
 
2. POLICY TRENDS AND KEY ELEMENTS OF TRADE POLICY 
Vietnam embarked on market-oriented policy reforms with a predominantly import-
substituting manufacturing sector developed under a long-standing protectionist, state-led 
trade regime.  Therefore, from the inception the policy regimes embodied a policy bias in 
favour of domestic-market oriented industries, which are dominated by state owned 
enterprises (SOEs).  Within this broader policy orientation, attempts have been made in 
recent years to promote export-oriented industries side by side with the protected trade 
regime, resulting in a dualistic policy regime.  Given the deep-rooted import-substitution 
bias in the policy regime, the emphasis on export promotion has essentially involved 
introducing certain counter-balancing measures in support of export-oriented activities 
with a view to offsetting the anti-export bias embodied in the protectionist regime.  The 
following discussion is arranged in line with this fundamental dualistic characteristic of 
the trade policy regime. We first look at instruments used for protecting domestic market 
oriented industries and followed by a discussion on policies implemented to redress anti-
export bias.  
 
Instruments of Import Protection 
(i) Import tariffs 
During the command-economy era, trade taxes were not important either as a revenue-
raising instrument or as a tool of development policy in Vietnam (as in other former 
centrally-planed economies).   The Law on Import and Export Duties introduced on 1 
January 1988 marked the beginning of the present trade tax system. The original import 
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tariff schedule was replaced in 1992 by a detailed, consolidated schedule based on the 
Harmonised System (HS) of tariff nomenclature.  The tariff structure was fine-tuned in 
subsequent years reflecting a trend towards an increasingly selective protection of 
consumer goods (cosmetics and some categories of food products), upstream activities 
related to textiles and garments (silk, cotton, and certain fibres) and some specifically 
protected intermediate goods (metal products, cements and glass).  Following the 
accession to the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and in preparation for the WTO 
accession, steps have been taken to restructure and rationalise the tariff structure over the 
past three years (under the Decision 1983 issued by the Ministry of Finance issued on 
December 11, 1998).   
 Under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) of the AFTA, Vietnam is 
committed to reducing tariff on all but few sensitive items from AFTA member countries to 
less than 5% by the year 2006.    Vietnam joined AFTA with a long list of items excluded 
from tariff reduction (Exclusion List, EL).  However, over in the past three years these items 
have   been gradually lifted to the Inclusion List, resulting in a decline in the average tariff 
applicable to imports from AFTA countries to about 7.3 per cent compared to 12.8 per cent 
at the time of becoming an AFTA member.   The impact of these tariff reductions on the 
average tariff level of Vietnam remains rather small because the extension of the Inclusion 
List has been done mostly by declaring goods that are already at zero or low rates and 
tariff reductions are yet to be announced  on products included in the general exception 
list.  
 
(ii) Non-tariff barriers 
After one-and-a-half decades of trade reforms, tariffs are now the major instruments used 
in regulating imports to Vietnam.  However, a number of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) still 
remains.   A discussion that focuses only on the tariff structure cannot, therefore, capture 
the overall price-raising and resource allocation effects of the Vietnamese trade policy 
regime. 
(a) Import Quota 
Import quotas have been used in Vietnam side by side with import tariffs in order to 
limits imports which directly compete with domestic production by State Owned 
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Enterprises.  By 1998, nine major products were remained under import quotas; 
petroleum, fertilizer, steel, cement, construction glass, motorcycles, cars of 12 seats, 
paper, sugar and liquor. These products accounted for approximately 40% of imports 
(CIE 1999) and over 45% of total manufacturing production (Athukorala 2002a). In 1999 
the number of products under quota restrictions was doubled mainly as a temporary 
measure to avert balance of payments pressure in the wake of the Asian Financial crisis.  
Over the past two years quotas have been gradually eliminated as part of the new 
emphasis on speeding up trade liberalization. Currently only two products, namely sugar 
and petroleum products, are subject to quotas, and the government has committed to 
lifting quotas on sugar imports by 2005 (Table 1).  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
(b) Tariff Rate Quota 
The latest addition to the list of trade policy instruments in Vietnam is tariff rate quotas 
(TQRs) (or duty quotas, as they are referred to in Vietnamese policy documents).   Seven 
agricultural commodities were brought under tariff rate quotas (TRQs) with effect from 1 
July by the Prime Ministerial Decision No 91/2003/QD issued on 9 may 2003.   The 
products were raw milk (HS 0401), condensed milk (0402), poultry eggs (0407), maize 
(1005), raw tobacco (2401), salt (2501), and cotton (5201, 5202, 5203).  Of these, the last 
three items were to come under TRQs with effect from 1 July, 2003. The Ministry of 
Trade was given authority to introduce TRQs on the remaining four commodities 
depending on conditions of domestic production and foreign trade. 
TRQs are obvious less trade distortionary compared to prohibitive tariffs (or 
general import quotas).  However, the market access rules under TQRs generally 
introduce scope for discriminating in the allocation of TRQs between source countries 
and domestic importers.  In particular, the administration of such quotas tends to 
legitimise a role for state-owned trading agencies.  There is evidence that, when such 
agencies have selling rights on the domestic market in addition to a monopoly on imports 
of the given products, they can charge excessive mark-ups and thereby distort domestic 
prices (Hoeckman and Kosteki 2002, p. 218).  For these reasons, trade analysts generally 
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consider TRQs a relatively covertly element of quantitative management of import trade, 
which has unfortunately been legitimised under the WTO. 
 
(c ) Import prohibition 
Like in many other countries import prohibitions in Vietnam are based primarily on 
health and defence considerations, and they do not seem to have a major distortion impact 
on trade.  The current list of prohibited items includes military equipment, toxic 
chemicals, antiquities, narcotics, firecrackers, poisonous toys, cigarettes, used consumer 
goods, and right-hand driving automobiles. 
 
(d) Special authority regulation 
A considerable number of import items (eg pharmaceuticals, some chemicals, some food 
items, fertilizer, and recording and broadcasting equipment) still require approval from 
relevant ministries.  By 2000, around 10% of imports (in value terms) was subject to this 
form of regulation.  As in many other countries, these regulations are generally 
maintained for heath and security reasons and they do not seems distort trade patterns. 
 
(e) Entry Barriers to Import Trade  
As early as the mid-1990s only licensed (authorised) trading companies were allowed to 
engage in foreign trade. In order to obtain an import/export license, enterprises needed to 
have a foreign trade contract and a shipping license, and to meet the requirements on 
minimum working capital ($ 200,000) and ‘skill’ in trade.  In 1996 the requirements on 
foreign trade contracts and shipment permission were removed, but the minimum 
working capital requirement continued to remain a major entry barrier, especially for new 
enterprises.  In 1998 there were only 2400 private sector companies involved in foreign 
trade compared to over 6000 SOE companies.   
Significant changes of requirements for private sector firms to engage in foreign 
trade were introduced by Decree 57/1998/ND-CP (31 July 1998). The Decree permitted 
all enterprises with business licenses to engage in foreign trade in the goods specified in 
their business license without requiring import/export licenses. The number of enterprises 
registered for foreign trade increased from 2400 in early 1998 to over 5500 (or 55% of 
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total number of 10000 trading companies) in 2002.  However, firms are still allowed to 
trade only in commodities registered in the business licenses, and it is difficult to move 
from one kind of business to another without approved modification of the licenses.  
There is evidence that regulatory requirements demanded by line ministries de facto 
prevent private firms from participating in rice exports and fertilizer imports (Auffret 
2003, p. 5). 
 
(f) The Regulatory Impediments  
In addition to the formal licensing procedures, administrative rigidities and delays in the 
Customs administration have continued to remain important non-tariff barriers. Firms 
have to spend long time on clearing Customs procedures. According to a recent survey of 
150 firms in textiles and garment industry by IMPR in 2001 approximately 20% of the 
firms had to spend 5 to 25 days and about 10% firms 15 to 32 days (World Bank 2002). 
Rigidities and delays in Customs procedures have also naturally given rise to widespread 
use of unofficial customs fee, which raise opportunity costs of private sector and make 
customs transactions time consuming and cumbersome.  For example, based on interview 
with managers of footwear exporting companies Boyed (2002) reports that the following 
‘standard’ unofficial fees are required to process incoming shipments: US$20 for clearing 
a 20 foot container, US$40 for a 40 foot container, US$ 100 late inspection fee’.   
This divergence between general policy of the government and detailed 
implementation documents of line ministries or interested government agencies often 
defeated the purpose of trade liberalization policy. Greater efforts need to be made to 
ensure that general policy once decided is not be distracted by implementation 
regulations. In terms of the law, entry rights of private enterprise in trading are the same 
as those of SOEs (Decree 57/1998/ND-CP, 31 July 1998). In reality, the export/import 
conditions required for import of several goods discourage export/import activities of 
non-state firms. Because of the close relationship between the line ministry in charge and 
the SOEs under its ownership or sponsorship, the SOE often had influence over setting 
conditions of participation of others for the good in question. These conditions usually 
put SOEs in a more advantageous position than non-state firms, as illustrated by the cases 
of rice and fertilizers. 
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 (g) Foreign Exchange Restrictions 
From time to time import flows have also been regulated in line with government 
priorities through regulating the release of foreign exchange by banks for meeting import 
payments.  For instance in late 1998, in face of the widening current account deficit 
following the onset of the East Asian crisis, the MPI in consultation with the Ministry of 
Trade and other relevant ministries, resorted to such control on imports of some groups of 
consumer goods.  The two major instrument used were limiting foreign exchange release 
for imports by foreign invested enterprises to the actual amount of foreign exchange they 
have brought into the country in the year (‘balance’ their foreign exchange) and an 
advanced payment requirement for importing consumer goods.   
In September 1998, the State Bank of Vietnam (the Central Bank) imposed a 
foreign exchange surrender requirement for exporters under which all exporting firms had 
to sell 80% of their foreign exchange earnings to banks within 15 working days of 
transfer of these funds into their accounts.  The surrender requirement was reduced to 
50% in August 1999 and to 40% in May 2001, and finally removed in December 2004. 
The foreign exchange balancing requirement for FIEs was relaxed in May 2000. From 
then on FIEs have been able to purchase foreign currency from domestic banks to repay 
loans obtained from offshore banks.  Although in principle all firms can buy foreign 
exchange from banks, in practice, only large firms, mostly SOEs are able to secure 
foreign exchange from state-owned commercial banks.   
 
Policies to Redress Anti-export Bias 
So far we have discussed the key elements of the trade policy regime that determine 
profitability of production for the domestic market.  As the famous Lerner symmetry 
theorem stipulates, these restrictions on imports act as a tax on export production.  They 
increase the cost of inputs to all industries thereby reducing relative profitability of 
exporting compared to production for the domestic market.  As many other developing 
countries which attempts to promote exports in the context of a restrictive trade regime, 
Vietnam has resorted to a number of measures to redress such anti-export bias.   
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(i) Duty free access to Imported Inputs 
When a country attempts to promote exports side by side with a protected trade regime 
for production for the domestic market, it is important to assure uninterrupted duty-free 
access to the imported intermediate inputs needed for export production.  There are two 
tools widely used for this purpose: export processing zone and import duty rebate.  
The GOVN passed legislation for setting up of FTZs in 1991. So far six EPZs 
have been set up of which only three EPZs are currently in operation (Linh Trung, and 
Tan Thuan (both in HCMC) and Numura in the North (Hai Phong). The other 3 have 
been converted into industrial zones given the poor investor response from pure export-
producing foreign investors.  Investment in the two zones, both in terms of the number of 
new firms entering and value of committed investment, has increased notably increased 
continuously over the past seven years.  The share of FTZ enterprises in total non-oil 
manufactured exports increased from 11% in 1995 to over 22% in 2001. Total 
employment in the two Zones amounted to over 80,000 thousand by the end of 2002.   
Firms operating in Vietnamese FTZ have duty free access to all inputs and enjoy various 
tax concessions comparable to or more attractive than those located in FTZs in other 
countries in the region (Athukorala 2002b). 
The duty rebate scheme in Vietnam was introduced in 1991.  In 1993 a duty 
suspension facility was added to the scheme, enabling export-oriented firms (firms 
exporting more than 50% of output) to suspend duty payments up to 90 days.  The 
suspension period was further extended to 275 days in 1998 for all enterprises, which 
import inputs for export production.   
The operation of the duty drawback scheme in Vietnam has been examined in 
detail as part of a recent World Bank study on export policies and performance (World 
Bank 2002). According to this study the operation of the scheme has improved 
considerably over the years. The time involved in processing duty rebate claims has 
become considerably shorter (now around 3-5 weeks compared to over 3 months at the 
formative stage of the scheme) as the customs officials gained experience in the 
implementation of the scheme. However, operation of the scheme still has left much to be 
desired, particularly for firms that export only part of their output or newcomers to 
exporting.  Customs officers often make arbitrary assumptions, and often take long time, 
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in deciding the proportion exported out of total output and input-output ratios applied in 
calculating the imports which may be imported duty free. In the absence of clear 
operational rules as to what evidence is to be supplied by the exporters in support of their 
application, the customs officers usually make decisions in an arbitrary, unpredictable 
fashion. If a given import item is not on the tariff schedule, customs officers wait for 
orders from their superiors, leading to unnecessary delays. These practices have also 
provided fertile ground for corruption, and favoured treatment of SOEs and well 
connected firms against other firms (particularly small- and medium scale one). 
Compared to the highly successful duty rebate schemes in other Asian countries 
(Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Sri Lanka, in particular), the Vietnamese scheme has two 
structural limitations. First, it provides only for refunding duties paid by export producers 
on imported inputs.  Local intermediate goods producers who supply inputs to export 
producers (‘indirect exporters’) are not eligible for duty rebates on imports used in 
production (that is, a local producer who supplies textile to producers of garments for 
export is not eligible for duty rebate on imports of cotton yarn).  This essentially creates 
an the unnecessary bias in favour of using imported inputs, discouraging intermediate 
processing of inputs for the use in export industries.   Second, duty rebates are estimated 
on a shipment-by–shipment basis based on “used-up ratios” declared and guaranteed by 
the importer (not on a pre-announced list of duty rebate rates). This practice works well 
for firms which import on a continuing basis, but problems arise when new and different 
cases have to be dealt with.   In addition to these limitations, there are also other 
administrative problems with duty drawback system including some unnecessary paper 
work required by the Customs. For example, exporters are required to submit a certificate 
of export issued by the overseas importer to get duty refund. There is anecdotal evidence 
that, because of the rigid implementation procedures of the duty rebate schemes, some 
private firms (mostly small and medium sized firms) tend to rely on SOEs for exporting 
their produce and for procuring imported inputs (World Bank 2002).  
 
(b )  Export Duty Removal 
In the early years of market-oriented reforms Vietnam introduced export duties on a 
number of export items.  They were justified at the time on grounds of protecting 
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environment, natural resources conservation and reserve inputs for domestic production. 
These duties were subsequently eliminated.  By 1998 only two products – crude oil and 
scrap metal – were subject to export duties. 
 
(c ) Exemption from domestic taxes 
Vietnam has a wide array of domestic taxes: corporate income tax, value added tax 
(VAT), special sale tax, licence tax, agricultural land use tax, tax on land transfers, and 
natural resource tax.  Concessions are given to exporters relating to corporate income tax 
and turnover tax, creating a tax wedge in favour of export production over production for 
the domestic market.   
From 1999 to 2003, Vietnam had a two-band corporate income system; industries 
25% and services 32%.  This was unified at 28% with effect from 1 January 2004. Profit 
from export production is taxed at concessionary rate depending on the degree of export 
orientation of production. Firms exporting between 50-80% of production are taxed at 
20% for twelve years (from the date when the project commences it production) while 
firms exporting at least 80% of production are taxed at a more favourable rate of 15% for 
fifteen years.  Non-exporting firms are also eligible to these concession depending on 
criteria such as, contribution to employment, size of the wok force, use of advanced 
technology, intensive use of local raw material, investment in rural areas, and 
contribution to infrastructure construction/development. 
VAT was introduced in January 1999 in place of the turnover tax.  It has four tax 
lines: 0% for all exports, 5% for essential goods and services (such as water, fertiliser, 
insecticides, medicine, educational equipment, baby toys and animal foods); 20% for 
some specific services; and 10% for all other goods and services.  The 20% rate was 
abolished on 1 January 2004, resulting in a three-band VAT system of 0%, 5% and 10%. 
Imports are subject to VAT at the same rates as domestically produced goods under each 
tax bracket.   
While the operation of tax administration in Vietnam has improved considerably 
in recent years, bureaucratic inertia and venality still believed to hinder effective 
provision of tax concessions for exporting firms, new small and medium scale firms in 
particular. The lack of clarity and transparency in the low, particularly in relation to tax 
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inspection and rulings, also create a climate of uncertainty, which makes it impossible for 
business to predict their tax liabilities (CIEM 1999).  
 
3. THE TARIFF STRUCTURE 
 
This section looks at the structure of applied tariffs (nominal protection) in Vietnam, in 
some comparison with selected countries in East Asia.  Clear understanding of the stature 
of nominal tariff is needed in order to examine the structure of effective protection in the 
next section.  Moreover, this subject is important in its own right for two reasons.  First, 
nominal protection (the price-raising effects of tariff) and other trade interventions are 
relevant to the consideration of consumption effect (but not the production or protective 
effects).  Second, the level and inter-industry variations in nominal tariffs (not the 
structure of effective protection) are the major focuses of international tariff negotiations.   
The present import duty structure in Vietnam has three different rates of tariffs:  
(1) Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) rates applicable to imports from the 
member countries of the ASEAN Free Trade Association (FTAs) (Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff. CEPT), (2) Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rates applicable to countries 
with which Vietnam enjoys the most favoured nation (MFN) status (The European 
Union, Japan, most Asian countries outside ASEAN, New Zealand, Australia) and (3) 
general rates (50% above MFN rates) applicable to imports from countries that do not fall 
under (1) and (2).   
Of these three categories of rates, by far the largest share of imports (over 95% in 
2002) enters Vietnam under MFN rates (category 2). The CEPT rates are currently 
applicable to only about 3.5% of total import value (or about 10% of imports from 
ASEAN countries). Imports under general rates are believed to be negligible.  For these 
reasons, the analysis in this and the following section focuses only on MFN tariffs. It is 
not possible to capture the incidence of the other two forms of tariffs in an aggregative 
analysis of this nature. 
The distribution of tariff lines at the six-digit level of the harmonised System is 
summarised for 1995, 1997, 2001 and 2003 in Table 2.  The average (unweighted) tariff 
rate has remained unchanged between 2001 and 2003, following a mild increase from 
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13.4 to 15.7 between 1997 and 2001. However, the dispersion of tariff rates (measured by 
the coefficient of variation) has declined persistently over time.   What these summary 
measures reflect is that, while some high rates have been eliminated over the years, there 
has been virtually no reduction in middle-range tariffs.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The maximum tariff rate came down from 200% in 1997 to 120% in 2001 and 
then to 113% in 2003.  In all four years less than one per cent of total tariff lines 
(accounting for around 5 per cent of import value) had tariff rates above 50%. These high 
tariff rates remained concentrated in four HS Chapter: Beverages, spirit and vinegar (HS 
22); tobacco and manufactured tobacco (HS 24), worn clothing (HS 63), and  vehicles 
and vehicle parts (HS 87)  
 
The decline in the degree of dispersion of tariff in 2003 over the previous years 
has come predominantly from a compression of rates at the lower end of the rate 
distribution. For instance tariff lines with rates between 1 –10 percent (inclusive) declined 
from 23 percent in 1995 to 13 per cent by 2003. This has been accompanied by an 
increase in the percentage of rates between 10 to 40 per cent (inclusive) from 33% to 
50% between the two years.   About one-third of the tariff lines had zero tariffs in all four 
years. 
The number of tariff bands in the tariff schedule declined from 36 in 1995 to 15 in 
2002.  This trend towards simplification of the tariff system seems to have unfortunately 
reversed in the process of fine-tuning of tariffs over the past two years.  By mid 2003, the 
number of tariff bands stood at 60. This increase has come from the introduction of 
fractional rates at the lower end, presumably reflecting the government’s attempt to 
respond to lobbying pressure from importers of intermediate goods (mostly SOEs).  
An analysis at the HS Chapter level suggests that there is considerable non-
uniformity of rates within and between HS chapters (data not reported here for brevity).  
For example, there are 11 different duty rates for various kinds of animal and vegetable 
oil (HS 15), 19 rates for plastic products (HS 39), 15 rates for iron and steel products (HS 
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73), and 41 rates for electrical and non-electrical machinery (HS 84 + 85). The degree of 
dispersion of rates also varies considerably across HS Chapters.  Tariff rates are generally 
higher for manufacturing compared to agriculture and other primary product sectors. This 
is consistent with patterns observed in other developing countries and reflects the belief 
in industrialisation as the road to economic independence and riches.  Within 
manufacturing category, tariff rates are particularly high for food processing and for 
certain consumer goods (notably garments, footwear, ceramic products and leather 
goods).  Certainly, there are likely to be significant unintended effects of this complex 
tariff schedule. 
A comparison of tariff rates for intermediate goods and final goods across HS 
chapters provides clear evidence of tariff escalation with the stage of production.   At the 
aggregate level, the weighted-average tariff on final goods in 2003 was 19.8 per cent 
compared to 11.4 per cent on intermediate goods (Table 3).  At the sectoral level, 
industries producing intermediate goods (chemicals, fertilizer, metal products and 
construction material, for example) have relatively low rates of tariff protection.  By 
contrast final- goods producing sectors (food and drinks, pharmaceuticals, garments ect.) 
have relatively high rates of protection. There is also similar tendency within sectors that 
produce both intermediate and final goods.  For example, in the case of metal products 
(HS 72 through 81), tariffs on intermediate goods varies in the range of 0-8 per cent, 
whereas most of the final good tariffs are above 20 per cent.   It is important to note that, 
while intermediate goods tariffs are generally lower than tariffs on end products, 
intermediate goods imported for use as inputs in product sectors where Vietnam has 
comparative advantage in export trade are much higher than those on inputs to import-
competing industries.   For instance woven fabric and knitted fabrics imports are taxed at 
40%.2   Most of the zero- or low-tariff rates are on items predominantly used by public 
sector enterprises (SOEs) as inputs in the production of intermediate goods or final goods 
for the domestic market. 
 
                                                 
2   As already noted, Vietnam has a comprehensive duty drawback scheme to compensate exporters for the 
anti-export bias resulting from these high duties on imported inputs.  As discussed below this scheme 
however seems to work well by and large for established, large-scale exporters.  Owing to some 
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Table 3 about here 
 
Vietnam’s tariff structure is compared in Table 4 with that of China and four 
fellow member countries of AFTA, namely Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and 
Thailand.3  The average (unweighted) tariff rate in Vietnam (16.65) is a little lower 
compared to China (17.48) and Thailand (18.48), but much higher compared to Indonesia 
(8.43), Malaysia (10.2) and the Philippines (7.6).  The degree of dispersion of tariff rates 
in Vietnam is much higher compared to China, the Philippine and Thailand, and lower 
compared to Indonesia and Malaysia.  The degree of dispersion of tariff rates (measured 
by the coefficient of variation, CV) in Malaysia is disproportionately affected by a few 
extremely high tariff rates for alcohols (1000% or more) and motor vehicles (over 300%).  
When these items are excluded, the CV decline from 340 to 62.   Over a third of tariff 
lines in Vietnam have above 25 per cent tariffs, compared to 22 per cent in Thailand, 16 
per cent in China, 7 per cent in Malaysia and less than 1 per cent in both Indonesia and 
the Philippines.    In sum, in spite of considerable adjustment over the past decade, 
Vietnam’s tariff structure is still out of line with the general patterns of the ASEAN 
countries and China.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
5. EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AND ANTI EXPORT BIAS 
As we have seen in the previous sections, the tariff structure in Vietnam is ‘cascading’ in 
nature, that is, tariffs are generally higher on final goods than on production inputs. An 
important implication of this cascading tariff structure is that the nominal tariff rates do 
not provide an accurate picture of the resource allocation effects of the overall tariff 
system.  Under a cascading tariff structure, the resource allocation effects of the tariff 
structure on a given product sector depend not only on the tariff rate applicable to that 
sector but also on tariffs on all other sectors which provide production inputs 
                                                                                                                                                 
administrative problems it seems less effective in compensating for small and medium scale firms and new 
entrants to export arena. 
3   Singapore is not included because it is not an appropriate comparator given its advanced stage of 
economic transformation and the virtual free-trade status.  
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(intermediate and capital goods) to the sector, both directly and indirectly.   In this section 
we attempt to examine the overall incentives provided for domestic traded goods 
production by the tariff structure by combining the tariffs on each sector and tariffs on its 
input-supplying sectors in the context of input-output linkages within the economy.  The 
analytical tool used for this purpose is the effective rate of protection (ERP) (Corden 
1971, Greenaway and Milner 2003).  
 
(a) The Basic Concept of ERP and Key Insights 
The ERP measures the proportionate increase in per unit value added of a sector due to 
the complete system of tariffs. More specifically, it takes into account the protection on 
output and the cost-raising effects of protection on inputs.  By definition, the ERP for 
sector j can be expressed as followed4: 
ERP
t a
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j i
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=
=
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1
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tj i
                                                
        (1) 
where is the nominal tariff on sector j,  nominal tariff on input i, the sum of the 
shares of intermediate inputs (1, …, n) in the final value of  product  j,  and  tariff 
on all intermediate inputs used in producing a unit of project j.  Equation (1) tells us that 
effective protection enjoyed by a given product depends upon tariffs on outputs and 
inputs and on the free trade input share.  Overall protection to value added depends upon 
the interplay between output and input tariffs (t
t j ti aij
i
n
=
∑
1
a tij i
i
n
=
∑
1
j and ti) and the share of imported inputs 
in production costs (aij). In other words, the overall tariff structure has both a tax and a 
subsidy element; whereas tariffs on the final good operate as a subsidy, tariffs on 
intermediate inputs operate as a tax.     
 We have so far assumed that tariff measure is the only instrument of trade 
protection.  In practice, countries use other instruments such as subsidies and import 
quotas in addition to tariffs as instruments of trade intervention.  To capture these 
 
4 See details of this formula in Corden (1971) and Greenaway and Milner (2003).  
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impacts,  should be defined in broader terms to combine the nominal tariff on activity j 
and tariff equivalent of subsides, quantitative restrictions, and other forms of trade 
intervention. 
t j
The conventional practice is to estimate a composite ERP for a given sector 
incorporating both incentives for export- and import-competing protection.  However, in 
the context of an economy like Vietnam (and most developing countries) where export-
promotion policies are pursued along-side import-substitution polices, it is important to 
estimate ERP for import competing and export-oriented activities separately. 
Let us denote ERP for production for domestic market and production for export 
in the same industry by ERPd and ERPe respectively.  Combining the two measures 
provide us with a useful summary measure of the export bias  embodies in the overall 
incentive structure.  
That is, 
 
)2(100*
)1(
)1(
1 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
+−=
x
d
ERP
ERPEBI  
 
where,  EBI  =  Export bias index 
A positive EBI implies an incentive bias against exporting (that is a bias in favour 
of import-competing production) and a negative EBI implies an incentive bias in favour 
of exporting (a bias against domestic sales).  For example an estimated EBI of 25 for a 
given industry suggest that under the given structure of protection, value added (returns 
to primary factors, labour and capital) in production for the domestic market in that 
industry is 25 per cent higher compared to production for export.  By contrast an 
estimated EBI of –25 suggest that value added in production for export made possible by 
the structure of protection is 25% higher than that in production for the domestic market. 
 
(b) Data 
The estimates of ERP reported in this paper are based on the tariff schedule as at mid-
2003 provided by the Ministry of Finance and intermediate import coefficient derived 
from the Input-Output Table for 2000 prepared by the General Statistical Office (GSO).  
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The nominal rates used in estimation are simply the official applied tariff rates (‘ex-ante’ 
rates) summed up at the input-output sector level using import value weights.   
The use of ex-ante tariff rates for measuring the price-raising effects of the tariff 
structure is of course problematic. First, as we have already noted, in Vietnam there are 
various formal and informal tax exemptions.  Moreover tax evasion is also considered a 
widespread phenomenon (see the discussion below on fiscal implication of import 
taxation).  Thus the ex-ante rates may overstate the prising rising effects. The ‘ex-post’ 
rate derived from actual duty collections and recorded imports appear to offer an 
adjustment for any potential upward bias.  But, disaggregated data on customs collection 
are not available for Vietnam.  In any case, the ‘ex-post’ rate provides a precise measure 
of the tariff-inclusive border price only if there is uniform exemption on the ex-ante rates 
for all importers (and for all sources of import) relating to a given import item.  With 
non-uniformity in the application of exemptions, it will be the marginal rather than the 
average influence (captured by the weighted rate) that is important.  In this case, the 
‘expost’ tariff may be a downwardly biased measure of the price-raising effect of border 
taxation of imports and the ex-ante rates may more accurately capture the structure of 
protection  (Greenaway and Milner 1991).  
Second, ex-ante (as well as ex-post) tariff rates fail to take account of quantitative 
restrictions and other forms of non-tariff barriers.   We have noted above that, while 
quantitative restrictions are now applied only to sugar (and petroleum products, which are 
not covered in our calculations of ERP), imports are subject to various forms of non-
transparent administrative protections.  In the presence of such restrictions, the ex-ante 
rate tends to understate the price-raising impact of actual border protection.  The obvious 
preferred strategy is to estimate the price-raising effect directly by comparing border 
(world) prices and domestic prices of the given products.  It is not possible to adopt this 
strategy in Vietnam because data on domestic prices are not readily available.  However, 
the available price comparisons for a limited number of commodities suggest that the 
wedge between the domestic price and border price are not very different from (and in 
some cases even lower than) scheduled tariffs (CIE 1999, CIE 2001, Athukorala 2002b).5 
                                                 
5 There is anecdotal evidence that the thriving cross-border illicit trade acts as a cushion against the price 
rising effects of QRs and other non-tariff barriers in Vietnam. 
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In particular, in the domestic market for sugar, a combination of smuggling and market 
saturation resulting from surge in domestic production has caused prices to fall to the 
import parity price after about 1999 (CIE, 2001).  Thus, it is unlikely that the use of 
applied tariffs as the measure of price-raising impact of the trade policy regime would 
result in a significant downward bias in the estimated incidence of effective production.  
Given the paucity of data, precise measurement of incentives for export-
competing production (ERPx) is even more difficult than measuring protection for 
import-competing production (ERPd).  Because of this reason, we come up with three 
alternative EBI indices based on three alternative measures of ERPx.  The first index 
(EBI1) represent the extreme case in which the export producer suffers from higher prices 
for intermediate goods imports, but is unable to benefit from exemptions of import duties 
on imported inputs or any other tax exemption (A case of complete failure of various 
policy measures aimed at cushioning the export producer against the anti-export bias of 
the protectionist trade regime).  Because export-oriented activities are often subject to 
tariffs on inputs and will not benefit from tariffs on exported output, this case implies an 
anti export bias across all sectors. Only the magnitude of the bias varies across sectors 
depending on the output tariffs.  The second index (EBI2), like EBI3, incorporates a tax 
wedge of 6% but assumes only 80% of the import duties on intermediate imports are 
reimbursed under the import duty rebate scheme.6 The third index (EBI3) depicts the case 
in which the duty rebate scheme is fully functional in reimbursing the exporter the total 
amount of duties paid on imported inputs and the existing tax exceptions creates a price 
wedge of 6% for export sales compared to domestic market sales (or tax exemptions 
amount to a 6% net subsidy for export production over production for the domestic 
market).  We believe that EBI2 depicts closely the experience of the average exporter and 
EBI3 the case of well-established, large exporting firms.  
 
(c ) Effective protection for Import-Competing Production 
                                                 
6  These figures comes from Athukorala 2002a.  The first figure (6% tax rebate) is based on returns to a 
survey of 170 firms recently conducted by the Institute of World Economy, Hanoi.  It is also consistent 
with the findings of a firm-level survey conducted by the ILO and the European Institute of Japanese 
Studies (Ronnas and Ramamurthy 2001). The second figure (80% duty rebate) is a rather arbitrary choice, 
but it is broadly consistent with exporters perceptions of the operational involved in the use of the current 
duty rebate scheme (World Bank 2002) 
 20
Effective protection estimates for import-competing production for 2003, together with 
the underline input and out put tariff and input coefficients, are reported in Table 5.  The 
estimates are summarised for the three major sectors of the economy - agriculture, mining 
and manufacturing – in Table 6, together with estimates for 1997 and 2000 from a 
previous study (Athukorala 2002A). 
 
Table 5 about here 
Table 6 about here 
 
The estimated ERP for import-competing production in all traded-goods sectors in 
2003 is 25%, compared to 58% in 2001 and 72.2% in 1997 (Table 6).  Thus there is 
evidence that recent changes in tariff policy in Vietnam have reflected in considerable 
decline in the level of effective protection.  A comparison of NRP and ERP estimates for 
the three years suggests that this decline has come predominantly from increase in input 
tariffs.  The NRP (on final goods) has changed only marginally over this period.   The 
degree of dispersion of ERP across sector (measured by the coefficient of variation) 
increased from 156% in 1997 to 172% in 2001 and then declined to 134 in 2003.    
At the sectoral level, ERP for agriculture increased from 7.4% in 2001 to 12.5% 
in 2003, reflecting a reversal in a mild decline recorded between 1997 and 2001 (from 
7.7% to 7.4%).  ERP for manufacturing declined persistently from 121% in 1997 to 96% 
in 2001 and then to 44% in 2003.   The mild increase in agricultural protection between 
2001 and 2003 has emanated predominantly from increase in output tariff, whereas 
increase in input tariff seems to have played a key role in the sharp decline in 
manufacturing protection.   The estimates also point to a clear bias against agriculture 
(and in favour of manufacturing) in the tariff structure. Despite decline in manufacturing 
protection and a mild increase in agricultural protection, this anti-agricultural bias has 
remained virtually unchanged across the three years.    
The disaggregated estimates for 2003 in Table 5 reveal a high degree of ERP 
variability in ERP across industries.  Three sectors – liquor, and beer and processed rise – 
have ERPs well over 100%.  ERPs for eleven sectors (tea, bricks and tiles, home 
appliances, textiles, clothing, carpets, plastic products, home appliances, motorcycles, 
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bicycles, and motor vehicles) range between 50% and 88%.  All other sectors have ERPs 
in the range of 0 to 50% with the majority clustering at the lower end.  ERPs for all 
product sectors in agricultural, forestry and fishing are well below the average protection 
rate for all traded goods sectors.   
The larger the dispersion of rates between sectors; the smaller the inter-industry 
differences in factor intensities; the lower the possibility of differential factor price effect 
on resource pulls. Ignoring the desirability or otherwise on the efficiency grounds of this 
structure of protection, it is unlikely that these estimates could be rationalised in terms of 
deliberate policy planning (that is, ‘giving as much protection as is necessary to 
complete’).   Very high protection provided to products such as tea, coffee, rice and 
wearing apparel in which the country has a clear comparative advantage remains a major 
anomaly in Vietnam’s tariff structure.    
The implications of the cascading nature of the tariff structure for the incentive 
structure for domestic manufacturing is vividly demonstrated by the ERP estimates for 
individual I-O industries.  Since the nominal protection rates (NRP) on final goods are 
generally higher than those on intermediate goods, the net effect of the nominal tariff 
structure has been to yield ERPs that exceed the nominal tariff rate in most industries. 
The rank correlation coefficient between NRP and ERP across the 83 sectors is rather 
weak (a mere 0.4), pointing to the importance of intermediate tariffs in determining the 
net protective effect of the tariff structure.  As already noted,  the significant decline in 
ERP for manufacturing as well as ERP for total traded good production has come from 
increase in input tariff  introduced with the objective of protecting SOEs involved in 
intermediate production, rather than from reduction in final good tariffs. 
Table 7 compares our ERP estimates for Vietnamese manufacturing with 
available estimates for seven major East Asian economies.  A strict comparison of 
estimates across the countries is not possible because of significant differences in 
estimates in terms of the coverage given to various elements of the trade regime in each 
country.   But based on the order of magnitude alone, one can safely infer that the current 
level of effective protection to domestic manufacturing in Vietnam is clearly out of line 
with the protection levels in other countries in the region.   By the mid-1990s, the level of 
manufacturing ERP in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines was less than half of the 
 22
present (mid-2003) level of manufacturing ERP in Vietnam (49%).   Thailand’s overall 
manufacturing ERP was a little higher, but this was because of high protection given to 
automobile industry, which has been scaled down in recent years.   But, it is important to 
note that the current (2003) level of manufacturing protection is higher than the level of 
protection enjoyed by the Korean manufacturing at the early stage of export-led 
industrialisation. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
(d)  Export Bias 
In the previous section we have examined the incentives faced by import-competing 
production in Vietnam.  This analysis has implications for export policy because import 
protection by definition is a tax on export-competing production.  However, to get a fuller 
picture about the nature of relative incentives for export-competing production, it is 
important to make a direct comparison of returns to domestic sales (or import-competing 
production) with the returns to export sales (export-competing production) within 
individual sectors. This is the purpose of this section.   
The estimated anti-export bias (EBI) indices are presented in Table 8 together 
with the underlying estimates of effective rates of protection for domestic-market 
oriented and export production (ERPd and ERPx).  For obvious reasons our focus here is 
only on the manufacturing sectors. 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
EBI1, which assumes the existing export incentive policies (duty rebate and other 
tax exemptions) to be completely inactive, provides a useful benchmark for our analysis.  
According to this index all industries suffer significant anti-export bias, with an average 
anti-export bias of 105% for all industries listed (implying that selling in the domestic 
market is almost two times profitable compared to exporting). A comparison of EBI1 
with the other indices clearly points to the important role played by the duty rebate and 
other tax exceptions in mitigating the anti-export bias in the tariff regime.  Under the 
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assumption of 80% import duty refund and a 6% price-wedge arising from other 
(domestic) tax exceptions (EBI2), the average anti-export bias decline from 105% to 
58%.   Under the assumptions of complete duty exemption a 6% price-wedge arising 
from domestic tax exemptions (EBI3), the measured degree of anti-export bias decline 
further to 25%.  
A key inference from this comparative analysis of the three policy scenarios is 
that, while various indirect measures to counterbalance the anti-export bias of the 
protectionist regime seem to have had some effect, they are unlikely to achieve the 
desired neutrality in the incentive structure even if the efficiency of their implementation 
is substantially improved.  More importantly, even in terms of EBI3 (which assumes 
complete duty rebate) there is a considerable bias against exporting in several of the 
sectors where a country of Vietnam’s level of development has ample scope of achieving 
export success, such as garments, plastic products, leather goods, ceramics and other 
manufacturing. While there is much room to improve the efficacy of the duty rebate 
scheme and other tax exceptions, the objective of removing anti-export bias cannot be 
achieved through these cushioning measures alone, without further actions to rationalise 
the tariff structure.  
 Note that the estimated EBI2 and ABE3 for a number of product sectors (such as 
wood products, basic organic chemicals, inorganic chemical fertilizer, pesticide, plastic 
products, various types of machinery, ferrous metal and animal feed) are negative, 
implying a positive bias in favour of export production.  These estimates simply reflects 
the  fact that, given the high defence of imported inputs which are imported at relatively 
high duty, the existing duty rebate scheme makes export oriented production in these 
sectors relatively more profitable compared to production for the domestic market (for 
which producers in these industries have to pay duty on imported inputs).   This by no 
means implies that the existing trade policy regime will be capable of making these 
industries export oriented.  Export success depends primarily on the comparative 
advantage of a given sector in international production.  Relative domestic incentives are 
only a facilitator of export success. 
 EBI for total manufacturing in 2003 is compared with estimates for 2001 in Table 
9.  There is a clear reduction in the degree of anti-export bias in the incentive structure in 
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terms of all three alternative measures.  It seems that recent tariff reductions on final 
goods have played an important role in reducing the bias against exporting.    This 
observation needs to be treated with care because, given the presence of an import duty 
rebate scheme for exporters, an increase in import tariffs automatically tilt EBI2 and 
EBI3 in favour of export production.  captured in EBI2 and EBI3 as a tariff on imported 
input .   However, the decline is anti-export bias is significant even in terms of EBI1 
which does not capture the import duty rebate effect.  
 
Table 9 about here 
 
6. THE STRUCTURE OF PROTECTION AND MANUFACTURING 
PERFORMANCE 
 
We have observed in the previous section that tariff policy in Vietnam has been basically 
derived by protection motive and that the Vietnamese economy has incurred considerable 
cost of resource misallocation owing to such policy. An obvious related question is 
whether protection can be justified on grounds of setting the stage for industrial 
transformation. A definitive analysis of these issues requires in-depth industry level case 
studies.  In this section we simply aim to put together existing evidence to address the 
issue of whether there is any evidence to suggest that protected industries have played a 
role in industrial transformation. 
Table 10 brings together our effective rate of protection estimates and selected 
performance indicators for the manufacturing sectors.  Given the highly aggregative 
nature of the data, it is not possible to undertake any meaningful statistical analysis of the 
relationship between protection and the structure and performance of manufacturing.  
But, a number of interesting patterns emerge from these data.  First, it is clearly evident 
that high protection rates are generally associated with industries dominated by SOEs 
and/or foreign invested enterprises (which are mostly join ventures with SOEs).    Most 
of the industries with greater participation of private enterprises such as leather and 
leather products, rubber and plastic products and furniture and other manufacturing 
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operates under relatively low protection.   Thus there is no evidence to suggest that the 
existing structure of protection can be justified on grounds of infant industry protection.  
 
Table 10 about here 
 
Second, the price cost margin (an indicator of profitability) is generally higher in 
highly protected industries (compares columns 1 and 6).  This comparison suggests that 
the existing structure of protection may have enabled certain industries to maintain profit 
margins at excessively high levels, at the expense of consumer welfare. This is an 
important aspect of protection-industry performance nexus, which certainly warrant 
further in-depth study.  
Third, capital intensity of production (measured in terms of both value added per 
worker (column 7) and capital per worker (column 8)) are generally higher those in 
highly protected industries.7 This implies that the existing structure of protection is not 
consistent with the employment generation objective of industrial policy.   During  1990-
2000, total manufacturing output grew by an impressive 9.5%, but employment grew 
only by a mere 1.8% reflecting the inherent capital intensity of the growth process.  The 
relative contribution of heavily protected industries such as motor vehicles, other 
transport equipment, and fabricated metal products to total industrial output and 
employment has continued to remain low compared to many other sectors enjoying 
relatively low protection.  
Finally, it is pertinent to comment briefly on the implications of the anti-export 
bias for export performance, an issue which has led to some controversy in the recent 
policy debate in Vietnam (Parker and Riedel 2002, pp. 11-12).    In recent years Vietnam 
has achieved rapid export growth in industries (in particular wearing apparel, shoes and 
furniture and electronics) where the incentive bias against exporting under the existing 
trade regime is very high.  Does this mean that the anti-export bias as measured in this 
study is a misleading indicator of the impact of the incentive structure on export 
performance?   The answer is a definite ‘no’.  
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The anti-export bias is an indicator of the relative profitability of production for 
the domestic market compared to exporting.   It is relevant for the production decision of 
a firm only if both these two options carry important weights in its marketing decision.    
Selling in the domestic (Vietnamese) market is not an option for firms (mostly foreign 
firms) who select Vietnam as an export platform as part of their global sourcing.    What 
is important for these firms is the relative profitability of producing in Vietnam compared 
to producing in other countries.  In fact, the data on the ownership structure of 
manufacturing exports from Vietnam clearly suggest that much of the recent export 
expansion has been accounted for by such firms.   For instance, the share of foreign 
invested enterprises in total manufacturing exports increased from 20% in the early 1990s 
to over 70% by the early 2000s (Athukorala 2002b).   The upshot of this emerging export 
pattern is that Vietnam has so far failed to entice pure local firms, in particular small and 
medium scale firms  (which always have a tendency to place a greater weight on the 
option of selling in the domestic market) to enter export markets (Athukorala and Matin 
2002).  It is in explaining this policy failure that we need a clear understanding of the 
incentive bias embodied in the incentive structure.   
 
7. CONCLUSION AND POLICY INFERENCES 
Over the past one-and-a-half decades, Vietnam has made significant progress in market-
oriented reforms. The transition to a market economy is far from complete, however. 
Despite some significant recent efforts to rationalise the tariff structure and to remove 
some QRs, tariffs are still high and non-uniform in Vietnam, and extensive explicit and 
implicit administrative barriers continue to impact on import flows. The structure of trade 
protection in Vietnam is clearly out of line with that of the major trading nations in the 
region, both in terms of the level and the dispersion of nominal and effective protection 
rates. 
Effective rate of protection for traded goods production (manufacturing, in 
particular) has recorded a significant decline over time.  But the level of effective 
protection is much higher compared to the major East Asian economies.  Moreover, 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 The only notably exception to this pattern is the wearing apparel industry, which has grown rapidly 
(despite domestic protection) owing to intrinsic comparative advantage of the country and preferential 
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increase in import duties on intermediate goods has played a much more important role 
than reduction in duties on final goods in the recent decline in ERP.   
  
The counterbalancing effect of measures implemented to redress the anti-export 
bias in the trade regime (duty rebate, turnover tax concession and profit tax concession) is 
much smaller in magnitude compares to the price-raising impact of the existing import 
tariff structure.  Thus there is a clear anti-export bias in the incentive structure, even 
though the degree of the bias has considerably declined in recent years. Ironically light 
manufactured goods industries such as garments, ceramics, footwear and sport goods, 
which have proved to be cradles for exporters in East Asian countries are among the 
sectors with above average anti-export bias (owing to very high import duties).  
Anti-export bias in the incentive structure hinders the emergence of pure private 
sector firms (small and medium scale firms in particular) as a powerful vehicle for export 
expansion.   It is not directly relevant for green-field foreign investors in export-oriented 
production because what is relevant for their profitability assessment is the relative 
attraction of Vietnam as a low-cost production platform compared to competing locations 
at the global scale.  Protection discourages entrepreneurs to take advantage of 
international market opportunities.  Much of the recent expansion in manufactured 
exports has come from foreign invested enterprises for which anti-export bias in the 
domestic incentive structure is not a concern.   The share accounted for by pure local 
firms, in particular small- and medium-scale firms in export expansion has declined in 
recent years.  This emerging dualistic export structure is consistent with the continuing 
anti-export bias in the incentive structure.   Given that tariffs on most intermediate 
imports have already reduced to low levels and there is limited room for giving further 
tax concessions and/or introducing new financial incentives for exporters, the only 
effective strategy available for Vietnam to reduce/eliminate anti-export bias is further 
tariff reduction. 
With tariffs coming down from highly restrictive levels, and QRs to be removed 
completely in the coming years, it is time to look at the entire tariff structure in totality, 
and to bring substantial uniformity into it.   Apart from the cost of resource misallocation 
                                                                                                                                                 
access to major markets (Hill 2000). 
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involved, the multiplicity of rates implies that protectionist lobbies find it easier to lobby 
for tariffs, whereas, if uniformity is adopted as a policy, it would become relatively 
unprofitable to lobby for ones’ tariff because of two reasons. First, the government could 
always argue that a specific demand for higher tariff could not be met because it would 
involve raising all other tariffs, which the government cannot do.  Second, the lobbyist’s 
advantage from getting the higher rate, thanks to its own lobbying (which cost money) 
would be reduced because other tariffs, including of its own rate would rise equally.  A 
move toward uniformity would be an effective way of reducing corruption involved and 
the arbitrary nature of the tax administration.  A move towards a greater uniformity in 
tariff rates will also help reducing delays and malpractices involved in customs 
procedures.  However, even under the most optimistic scenario for liberalisation reforms 
in Vietnam, tariffs are unlikely to come down to warrant abolishing the existing duty 
rebate scheme.  As long as there are significant tariffs on intermediate imports there is a 
clear need for an efficient duty rebate scheme for providing export producers with ‘free-
trade conditions’ in procuring inputs.   
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Table 1: Products subject to Quantitative Restriction (QR) 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Petroleum Petroleum Petroleum Petroleum Petroleum Petroleum 
Sugar Sugar Sugar Sugar Sugar Sugar 
Fertilizer Fertilizer Steel Steel Cement  
Steel Steel Cement/Clinker Cement/Clinker Motorcycles  
Cement/Clinker Cement/Clinker Glass Motorcycles   
Glass Glass Motorcycles Cars    
Motorcycles Motorcycles Cars  Vegetable oil   
Cars  Cars  Paper    
Paper Paper Vegetable oil    
 Electric fans     
 Ceramic tiles     
 Porcelain      
 Caustic soda     
 Bicycles     
 Vegetable oil     
 Plastics     
 Plastic packaging     
 
Sugar:    There is complete import prohibition on sugar.  licensing, but licences are not  issued 
Source:  Parker  and Riedel (2002), and various World Bank and IMF secondary sources.  
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Table 2:  Summary of the Import Tariff Structure in Vietnam - 1995, 1997 and 2001 
  (Applied rates)  
 May 1995 March 1997 December 20001 December 2003 
 Number % Number % Number % Number % 
    0 976 31.1 978 31.3 2049 32.5 1620 31.7
  1-  5 645 20.5 697 22.3 1170 18.7 878 17
  5-10 299 9.6 301 9.6 540 8.6 412 7.9
10-15 66 2.1 96 3.1 0 0 103 2
15-20 572 18.2 317 10.2 0 0 418 8.2
20-25 40 1.3 46 1.4 3 0 43 0.8
25-30 215 6.9 244 7.8 649 10.3 487 9.5
30-35 49 1.6 26 0.8 0 0 21 0.4
35-40 144 4.5 253 8.1 667 10.6 580 11.4
40-60 104 3.2 152 4.8 586 9.3 513 10
60-80 10 0.3 7 0.3 2 0 9 0.1
80-100 1 0 2 0.1 50 0.8 16 0.3
100 < 14 0.5 6 0.2 8 0.1 7 0.1
         
Total tariff lines 3135 100 3126 100 5724 90.9 5107 100
Total tariff bands 36  35  15  60  
Range 0 to 200% 0-200% 0 to120% 0-113%  
Mean tariff rate 12.8  13.4 15.7  16.65  
Coefficient of 
variation (CV) 
131  128 116.3  114.77  
Note: CV      Standard deviation as a percentage of the mean. 
Source:    1995 and 1997: CIE (1997), 2001:  Athukorala (2002), and 2003: compiled 
from the tariff schedule provided by the Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  3:  Average Tariff on Intermediate,  
                Final and Total Imports, 2003   
 Simple 
average 
Weighted 
average1
Intermediate 11.2 11.4 
Final goods 21.9 19.8 
Total 16.7 16.1 
 
Notes: (1) Weighted by 2000 import values. 
 
Source: Compiled from Tariff Schedules provided by the Ministry of Finance 
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Table 4:  Summary of the Tariff Structure in Selected Asian Countries  
Tariff rates 
China 
2001 
Indonesia 
2001 
Malaysia 
2001 
Philippines 
2001 
Thailand 
2002 
Viet Nam 
2003 
 No lines % No lines % No lines % No lines % No lines % No lines %
             
0-5 440 8.6 2,969 58.1 3,077 60.3 2,760 53.99 1,238 24.5 2498 48.9
5-10 1,353 26.5 749 14.7 350 6.9 1,441 28.19 1,279 25.3 55 1.1
10 – 15 1,003 19.7 782 15.3 253 5.0 380 7.43 154 3.0 396 7.8
15 – 20 754 14.8 496 9.7 724 14.2 448 8.76 1,110 22.0 482 9.4
20 – 25 617 12.1 74 1.4 339 6.6 3 0.06 19 0.4 43 0.8
25 – 30 315 6.2 6 0.1 279 5.5 15 0.29 686 13.6 487 9.5
30 – 40 502 9.8 7 0.1 28 0.5 13 0.25 158 3.1 598 11.7
40 – 50 50 1.0 8 0.2 10 0.2 35 0.68 14 0.3 509 10.0
50 – 60 7 0.1 2 0.0 9 0.2 17 0.33 390 7.7 7 0.1
60 – 80 29 0.6 2 0.0 9 0.2 0 0.00 8 0.2 9 0.2
80 – 100 15 0.3 1 0.0 4 0.1 0 0.00 0 0.0 16 0.3
100 < 13 0.3 14 0.3 24 0.5 0 0.00 0 0.0 7 0.1
Total  Lines 5,098 100.0 5,110 100 5,106 100 5,112 100 5,056 100 5,107 100
Tariff bands  57  52  45  38  45  60  
Range tariff 1-122 0 - 170 0-1195 0 - 60 0 - 80 0-113  
Average Tariff         17.48 8.43 10.2 7.6 18.48 16.65
CV 71.3        127.8 340.3 93.9 84.4 114.8
Source:  Compiled from International Economic Data Base, Australian National University. 
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Table 5: Effective Rate of protection and its Components, 2003 
I-O 
code 
 
 
I-O Industry/Sector 
 
 
Value 
added 
(%) 
  Σaij
 
 
Σaijt 
 
 
NRP 
 
 
ERP 
 
 
 Agriculture1,2 57.68 23.44 1.52 11.06 12.52
1 Rice  19.01 28.33 1.06 13.84 17.84
2 Natural rubber (piece, sheet or tape) 0.96 18.75 0.48 3.00 3.10
3 Coffee beans 2.35 27.63 0.24 28.60 39.19
4 Sugar cane 1.18 18.70 0.47 0.00 -0.58
5 Tea 0.26 24.76 0.79 50.00 65.41
6 Other crops 15.24 15.00 0.34 1.24 1.05
7 Pig meat (all kinds) 3.42 43.79 3.65 0.00 -6.49
8 Cow (all kinds) 0.28 38.71 2.55 5.00 3.99
9 Poultry 2.03 28.80 2.96 2.50 -0.64
10 Other Livestock 1.63 35.68 2.73 5.20 3.83
13 Forestry 3.27 13.00 0.97 5.00 4.63
14 Sea and aquatic fishing 3.72 20.02 3.72 30.00 32.85
15 Fish farming 4.32 18.30 4.55 30.00 31.15
       
 Mining2 2.19 29.34 3.59 3.55 -0.03
16  Coal 1.25 26.84 2.51 2.47 -0.05
17 Metallic ore 0.10 41.04 1.30 1.22 -0.14
18 Stone/granite 0.41 36.45 6.81 7.56 1.17
19 Sand, Gravel 0.19 24.50 4.17 5.00 1.09
20 Other none-metallic minerals 0.24 29.15 4.17 2.16 -2.84
       
 Manufacturing2 40.14 55.30 11.07 29.23 43.94
22 Processed, preserved meat and by-products) 0.34 60.82 2.92 10.00 18.08
23 Processed vegetable, and animal oils and fats 0.40 56.03 2.81 13.61 24.57
24 Milk, butter and other dairy products 0.61 56.54 11.93 23.76 27.22
25 Cakes, jams, candy, coca, chocolate products 0.43 44.50 11.95 48.17 65.25
26 Processed and preserved fruits and vegetables 0.30 42.71 4.52 34.30 51.98
27 Liquor (excluding beer) 0.17 39.33 10.40 102.15 151.24
28 Beer 1.40 37.62 7.30 100.00 148.60
29 Non-alcoholic beverages 0.48 53.20 9.09 50.00 87.41
30 Sugar of all kind 0.92 58.03 4.37 18.65 34.00
31 Coffee, processed 0.08 53.87 16.57 43.62 58.65
32 Tea, processed 0.19 43.17 20.33 50.00 52.20
33 Cigarettes and other  tobacco products 0.59 65.42 15.15 34.28 55.30
34 Processed seafood and by products  2.15 65.77 18.72 31.15 36.31
35 Rice, processed 2.21 85.52 12.17 30.00 123.18
36 Other food manufactures 1.07 71.03 7.24 17.08 33.96
37 Glass and glass products 0.35 38.51 5.62 23.94 29.81
38 Ceramics and by products 0.17 53.31 3.99 23.38 41.53
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39 Bricks, tiles 1.32 45.28 10.47 49.96 72.16
40 Cement 1.78 50.30 15.28 40.00 49.73
41 Concrete, mortar and other cement products 0.25 47.11 8.63 25.20 31.32
42 Other building materials 0.24 45.69 8.17 8.32 0.29
43 Paper pulp and paper products  and by products 0.87 49.17 6.93 15.62 17.09
44 Processed wood and wood products 1.39 56.29 3.98 4.48 1.15
45 Basic organic chemicals 0.06 35.09 6.78 1.48 -8.18
46 Basic inorganic chemicals 0.19 42.81 1.94 1.99 0.09
47 Chemical fertilizer 0.69 46.32 1.68 0.36 -2.45
48 Other fertilizer (non-chemical) 0.13 41.01 1.89 0.00 -3.21
49 Pesticides 0.20 37.01 2.98 3.20 0.34
50 Veterinary drugs 0.10 38.69 1.78 0.00 -2.91
51 Medicine 0.58 51.10 2.76 4.72 4.01
52 Processed rubber and by products 0.78 46.89 2.99 7.99 9.41
53 Soap, detergents 0.16 64.04 2.41 21.42 52.84
54 Perfumes and other toiletry preparation 0.65 57.78 3.71 18.05 33.99
55 Plastic, original and semi-processed 0.20 56.77 2.03 1.01 -2.36
56 Plastic products 1.23 52.73 3.37 30.98 58.41
57 Paints 0.25 58.54 2.68 3.77 2.63
58 Ink, varnish and other painting materials 0.02 44.37 3.54 4.96 2.55
59 Other chemical products 0.16 50.10 3.72 4.36 1.27
60 Medical instrument and apparatus 0.20 39.00 3.00 0.13 -4.70
61 Precision and optical equipment 0.04 48.70 4.83 7.63 5.46
62 Home appliances and parts 0.21 51.78 10.02 35.97 53.83
63 Motorcycles and accessories 1.26 68.59 32.39 60.00 87.91
64 Bicycles and accessories 0.10 65.88 17.43 30.83 39.27
65 Machine tools 0.15 49.57 5.99 6.44 0.88
66 Other general purpose machinery 0.11 54.06 4.13 6.33 4.79
67 Special –purpose machinery 0.52 56.28 9.18 2.99 -14.15
68 Motor vehicles 1.10 47.22 26.95 68.75 79.22
69 Other transport equipment 0.75 28.17 5.12 24.23 26.60
70 Transformers 0.08 45.33 4.38 11.68 13.35
71 Other electrical machinery and equipment 1.02 59.19 7.22 4.67 -6.26
72 Broadcasting, TV and communication machines 0.56 62.15 11.03 16.11 13.43
73 
Non-ferrous metals and products  (except 
machinery equipment) 1.26 61.27 5.44 5.74 0.75
74 
Ferrous metals and products (except machinery 
equipment) 0.50 56.72 14.50 5.43 -20.94
75 Textile 1.10 60.98 10.98 38.67 70.97
76 Fibbers, thread (all kinds) 0.47 43.39 4.20 4.94 1.32
77 Clothing  2.23 65.75 23.24 49.58 76.92
78 Carpets and tapestry textile 0.06 53.57 7.72 40.00 69.51
79 
Weaving and embroidery of textile (except 
carpets) 0.42 43.85 10.35 30.91 36.61
80 Leather (products of tanneries) 0.33 52.59 6.89 7.64 1.60
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81 Leather goods 2.30 63.23 13.68 30.08 44.61
82 Animal feeds 0.43 63.11 9.96 10.00 0.12
83 Products of printing industry 0.52 21.34 13.54 8.90 -5.90
84 Publishing 0.23 34.82 4.83 4.77 -0.09
85 Products, unclassified 1.07 26.74 13.78 31.08 23.61
       
 All traded goods sectors2 100 36.38 5.40 18.20 24.87
Note: Agriculture excluding irrigation and agricultural services (I-O sectors 11and 12) 
2. Weighted average (based on value added). 
Source:    Methodology and data sources are discussed in Section 3   
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Table 6:  Summary of NRP and ERP Estimates, 1997, 2001 and 2003 
 1997 2001 2003 
 NRP ERP NRP ERP NRP ERP 
Weighted average       
Agriculture 8.12 7.74 6.28 7.43 11.06 12.52
Mining 9.42 6.05 8.91 16.39 3.55 -0.03
Manufacturing 30.63 121.47 25.28 95.97 29.23 43.94
Total tradables 20.95 72.22 17.92 58.46 18.2 24.87
       
Simple average 23.32 59.54         20.14 54.1 19.98 26.23
CV 133.81 156.01 149.9 172.34 106.51 134.93
       
       
 
Source: 1997 and 2001: Athukorala (2002), Appendix Table 2; and this paper (Table 5) 
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Table 7: Effective Rate of Protection in Manufacturing in Selected East Asian 
Countries 
 
 Year ERP Source 
Indonesia** 1975 74 World Bank (1993) 
 1987 70 Fane and Condon (1996) 
 1990 59 World Bank (1993) 
 1995 25 Fane and Condon (1996) 
South Korea 1970 40 World Bank (1993) 
 1975 55 World Bank (1993) 
 1980 67 World Bank (1993) 
 1985 80 World Bank (1993) 
 1988 28 Panagariya (1994) 
Malaysia 1969 45 Salleh and Meyanadan (1993) 
 1979/80 31 Salleh and Meyanadan (1993) 
 1988 23 Panagariya (1994) 
 2003 16 Athukorala (2005) 
Philippines 1992 32 Panagariya (1994) 
 1999 10 WTO (1999)*  
Thailand 1981 74 World Bank (1993) 
 1988 51 Panagariya (1994) 
 2002 25.2 Athukorala et al 2004 
 2004 22.7 Athukorala et al 2004 
Vietnam 1997 121  Athukorala 2002a 
 2002 95  ---do -- 
 2003 44 This paper  
Notes:  
* Calculated as the weighted average of estimates by industry reported in the given 
source.  Weighting was done by using value added. data from UNIDO, Yearbook 
of Industrial Statistics.   
** Estimates for non-oil manufacturing. 
# ERP estimate for total manufacturing (72)   has been influenced by  abnormally 
high ERP for  motor vehicle industry (497) which account for only 8% of total 
manufacturing value added. When this sector is excluded, the estimates drops to 33. 
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Table 8:  Anti-Export Bias and Related Data 
Code Commodities 
Export/ 
output (%) 
 
Export  
share  
(%)2 EBI1 EBI2 EBI3 
       
22 Processed, preserved meat and by-products) 14.82 0.39 27.59 7.98 2.39
23 Processed vegetable, and animal oils and fats 41.94 0.76 33.07 14.77 9.61
24 Milk, butter and other dairy products 21.25 0.94 75.37 38.52 11.79
25 Cakes, jams, candy, coca, chocolate products 11.40 0.29 110.62 76.59 49.13
26 Processed and preserved fruits and vegetables 24.71 0.39 65.00 45.91 37.57
27 Liquor (excluding beer) 9.17 0.06 203.21 161.22 128.63
28 Beer 1.27 0.09 181.55 147.96 126.79
29 Non-alcoholic beverages 0.60 0.02 132.57 92.64 66.12
30 Sugar of all kind 8.04 0.51 49.59 26.47 17.24
31 Coffee, processed 2.33 0.01 147.60 88.27 40.39
32 Tea, processed 59.83 0.58 136.99 85.76 37.66
33 Cigarettes and other tobacco products 1.66 0.14 176.39 88.70 32.34
34 Processed seafood and by products  81.59 15.62 200.81 84.76 15.98
35 Rice, processed 19.32 9.80 1300.69 200.80 57.78
36 Other food manufactures 8.77 1.11 78.61 33.01 10.98
37 Glass and glass products 13.29 0.20 42.86 26.70 18.27
38 Ceramics and by products 44.26 0.57 54.75 33.50 25.41
39 Bricks, tiles 0.65 0.04 112.91 79.98 55.15
40 Cement 0.29 0.04 116.22 71.17 33.60
41 Concrete, mortar and other cement products 0.00 0.00 56.93 33.61 17.94
42 Other building materials 0.17 0.00 18.04 1.29 -9.69
43 Paper pulp and paper products  and by products 9.20 0.59 35.57 16.05 4.73
44 Processed wood and wood products 44.39 4.30 11.29 -4.97 -11.06
45 Basic organic chemicals 27.77 0.08 2.54 -8.98 -15.95
46 Basic inorganic chemicals 24.63 0.20 3.60 -7.14 -9.41
47 Chemical fertilizer 0.09 0.00 0.70 -10.24 -12.26
48 Other fertilizer (non-chemical) 3.72 0.02 0.00 -10.05 -12.15
49 Pesticides 5.77 0.04 5.33 -5.10 -8.39
50 Veterinary drugs 0.00 0.00 0.00 -9.65 -11.56
51 Medicine 11.46 0.34 10.23 -3.48 -7.36
52 Processed rubber and by products 7.65 0.30 15.94 2.45 -1.69
53 Soap, detergents 9.00 0.10 63.84 37.31 30.99
54 Perfumes and other toiletry preparation 6.37 0.24 46.88 25.00 17.32
55 Plastic, original and semi-processed 4.42 0.06 2.45 -11.33 -14.26
56 Plastic products 4.97 0.32 70.56 48.05 40.57
57 Paints 1.52 0.02 9.73 -6.10 -10.34
58 Ink, varnish and other painting materials 0.00 0.00 9.52 -2.97 -7.43
59 Other chemical products 9.73 0.08 9.44 -4.51 -9.60
60 Medical instrument and apparatus 19.67 0.15 0.22 -10.01 -13.24
61 Precision and optical equipment 179.46 0.37 16.42 1.24 -5.58
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62 Home appliances and parts 0.00 0.00 94.17 60.54 36.81
63 Motorcycles and accessories 0.32 0.04 ---(1) 413.47 57.77
64 Bicycles and accessories 71.51 0.73 184.71 81.54 18.44
65 Machine tools 7.99 0.07 14.49 -1.47 -9.84
66 Other general purpose machinery 10.80 0.07 15.14 -1.02 -7.31
67 Special –purpose machinery 196.64 6.22 8.65 -11.44 -24.51
68 Motor vehicles 0.84 0.04 266.18 154.13 60.92
69 Other transport equipment 9.20 0.29 36.32 23.34 16.84
70 Transformers 117.54 0.46 23.22 8.40 2.14
71 Other electrical machinery and equipment 29.71 2.42 13.90 -6.76 -18.27
72 Broadcasting, TV and communication machines 69.57 3.54 60.06 22.57 -2.09
73 Non-ferrous metals and products  (except machinery equipment) 7.31 1.06 17.23 -3.35 -12.76
74 Ferrous metals and products (except machinery equipment) 23.83 0.79 18.88 -9.20 -30.57
75 Textile 15.23 1.54 137.92 84.10 48.18
76 Fibbers, thread (all kinds) 33.46 0.84 9.43 -3.20 -8.39
77 Clothing  78.96 21.44 450.17 179.74 50.55
78 Carpets and tapestry textile 82.63 0.28 103.34 70.17 50.11
79 Weaving and embroidery of textile (except carpets) 1.64 0.03 67.49 42.40 23.42
80 Leather (products of tanneries) 5.77 0.11 18.86 0.56 -9.82
81 Leather goods 60.24 16.49 130.23 67.05 24.32
82 Animal feeds 0.40 0.02 37.13 5.75 -13.89
83 Products of printing industry 0.00 0.00 13.67 0.26 -12.57
84 Publishing 1.19 0.01 7.91 -3.26 -8.51
85 Products, unclassified 60.73 4.72 52.24 32.71 14.25
 Total manufacturing 29.70 100.00 105.04 57.64 24.96
Notes 
(1) EBI is undefined because value added in export production is negative (implying 
extremely high (infinite) anti-export bias).  
(2) Sectoral share in total manufacturing exports in 2000. 
 
 
Table  9:  Summary of Anti-Export Bias Estimates for the Manufacturing Sector , 
2003 
Export-bias index 2001 2003 
EBI1 483.2 105.4 
EBI2 137.1 57. 7 
EBI3 55.0 25.0 
EBI1  Captures the impact of import protection only (effects of duty rebate and domestic 
tax exemption for exporters set at zero)  
EBI2 Import protection +  80% duty rebate + 6% tax wedge for export production over  
domestic market oriented production 
EBI3 Import protection +  100% duty rebate + 6% tax wedge for export production over  
domestic market oriented production 
 
Source:  Athukorala (2002), Table 9 and this paper (Table 8). 
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Table 10: Effective Protection and Key Indicators of  the Structure and Performance of  the Manufacturing Sector 
 Industry 
code 
ERP FIE 
share 
in 
output 
 
SOE 
share in 
output 
Employ
ment 
share 
(%) 
Wage 
share in 
value 
added 
(%)1
Price-cost 
margin 
(%)2
Value 
added 
per 
worker 
Dong 
‘ooo 
Capital per 
worker3 
Dong ‘ooo 
Import 
share in 
total 
inputs 
Growth 
of 
output 
1990-
2000 
Growth 
of 
employ
ment 
1990-
2000 
           (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
15 Food, beverages and tobacco          72.98 48.8 39.3 12.2 18.7 21.5 72786 16021 27.5 8.0 -2.2 
16          Tobacco products 55.3 98.5 1.5 1 7.9 42.2 244843 8037 54 9.8 -5.0*
17 Textiles          70.97 49.8 43.4 10.5 34.2 20.7 29557 16774 57.8 13.2 -3.1 
18 Wearing apparel          70.56 34.2 47.1 15.5 66.5 14.4 15415 4985 59.7 15.4 10.2 
19 Leather products          39.15 17.5 67.7 19.2 81.4 5.2 14034 6340 69.3 3.0 38.3 
20 Wood and wood products  31.1        1.15 28.5 2.5 45.3 14.7 16866 2179 17.5 12.9 3.8 
21 Paper and paper products          17.09 58.6 17.2 2.7 36.9 12.8 30117 9607 39.2 8.3 3.6 
22 Printing and publishing          -4.09 97.1 1.1 1.8 29.7 21.7 58422 6648 16.1 -19.8 6.0 
23 Coke and petroleum products 2.9 --- 76.7 0.1 16.6 14.4 248322 36228 57 14.1 73.7* 
24 Chemical and chemical products          9.67 50.8 38.9 4 30.2 15.7 64961 7390 34.1 18.2 4.8* 
25 Rubber and plastic products          35.67 47.7 28.5 3.5 34.5 17.4 39448 12583 53.8 13.3 18.1* 
26 Non-metallic mineral products          50.83 62.7 29.6 7.1 23.1 27.2 54321 11239 16.8 10.7 -3.6* 
27 Base metal products          0.75 40.8 56.5 2.9 32.1 11.3 39391 10071 49.5 15.9 1.5* 
28 Fabricated metal products -
20.94 
23.9        58.4 2.3 44.5 13.1 37773 10668 42.9 13.5 8.8* 
29 Machinery and equipment -8.58 43 36.6 2.8 36.6 19.1 31716 4215 35.7 14.6 3.0* 
30 Office, accounting and computing 
machines 
-
14.15 
---        100 0.3 15.4 4.2 91518 49647 35.6 20.4 42.7* 
31 Electrical machinery          13.15 47.7 40.8 2.4 42.9 15.4 40786 8311 54.7 12.6 -9.0 
32 Television and communication 
equipment 
13.43         15.1 82.9 1.4 21.5 16.6 90708 32202 65.2 12.0 -10.6 
33 Medical and optical equipment, and 
watches  
-2.95         22.9 71.5 0.4 49.9 14.5 38484 13987 55.3 13.1 15.5* 
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34 Motor vehicle          79.22 18.2 77 1 24.2 25.6 69045 12880 52.7 19.9 16.1* 
35 Other transport equipment          28.1 24.1 70.8 2.3 39.1 11.8 37835 4106 55.5 13.2 7.5* 
36 Furniture and other manufactures 23.61 8.5 60.7 4 60.7 10.2 16272 3542 37.3 12.2 4.4* 
37 Total          43.9 43.6 45.4 100 33.1 18 37700 10169 39.3 9.5 1.8 
Change last two columns. First row last 
(1) Total wage bill as a share of total value added. 
(2)  Price cost margin  = [(gross output – material input – wages)/gross output]*100. 
(3)       End-of-year stock of machinery and equipment investment divided by the number of employees.  
* Data for 1995-2000. 
---        Zero or negligible. 
 
Source: Column 1: Table 10 above; Columns 2-9: compiled from, Statistical Publishing House (2000), Analysing the Results of the Industrial 
Survey of Vietnam – 1999, Hanoi, and Columns 10 and 11: Compiled from General Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook, Hanoi (various 
issues
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